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NOTES AND COMMENTS
within the meaning of § 2036(a)(2) if the settlor must exercise the power
in a general fiduciary capacity. It is apparently irrelevant that the fidu-
ciary duty is owed to parties other than the beneficiaries and remainder-
men of the trust.
The impact of United States v. Byrum on estate planning and taxation
will ultimately depend upon the reading and interpretation given the
decision by the lower courts as they apply § 2036(a) in future cases. The
likelihood of misinterpretation and inconsistent interpretation is high.
Congress may or may not choose to amend § 2036(a) to encompass
situations such as that in Byrum, but in any event amendment to the
statute is needed to bring clarity to the law.
T. N. MCJUNKIN
ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE OF COURSE OF
DEALING AND USAGE OF TRADE UNDER
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-202(a)
A businessman generally contracts without conscious reference to the
customs and usages of his trade and to his prior course of dealing. Conse-
quently, he rarely includes these commercial understandings expressly in
his writings.' Therefore, in attempting to construe a contract to conform
to the intentions and expectations of the parties at the time the agreement
was drafted,2 some courts have been cognizant of the reality of the market
place and have permitted course of dealing and usage of trade to be
utilized in interpretation.3 Since virtually all jurisdictions have adopted
'Nicoll v. Pittsvein Coal Co., 269 F. 968, 971 (2d Cir. 1920).
'See 3A CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 538 (1960); S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 600 (3d ed.
1961).
2E.g., McAfee v. City of Garnett, 205 Kan. 269, 469 P.2d 295, 299 (1970).
'The following are the state statutes containing the language of Uniform Commercial
Code § 1-205: ALA. CODE tit. 7A, § 1-205 (1966); ALASKA STAT. § 45.05.028 (1962);
ARIz. REV. STAT. § 44-2212 (1967); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-1-205 (1961); CAL. COMM.
CODE § 1205 (West 1964); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 155--205 (1963); CONN. GEN.
STAT. REV. § 42a-1-205 (1960); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5A, § 1-205 (Spec. UCC Pamphlet
1967); D.C. CODE ANN. § 28:1-205 (1967); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 671.1-205 (1966); GA.
CODE ANN. § 109A-1-205 (1962); HAWAII REV. LAWS § 490:1-205 (1968); IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 28-1-205 (1967); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 26, § 1-205 (Smith-Hurt 1963); IND. ANN.
STAT. § 19-1-1-205 (repl. vol. 1964); IOWA CODE ANN. § 554.1205 (1967); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 84-1-205 (1965); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 355.1-205 (1969); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 11, § 1-205 (1964); MD. ANN. CODE art. 95 B, § 1-205 (1963); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.
106, § 1-205 (1963); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 19.1205 (rev. vol. 1964); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 336.1-205 (1966); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41A:1-205 (Spec. UCC Supp. 1967); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 400.1-205 (1965); MONT. REV. CODES AN. § 87A-1-205 (1964); NEB. REV.
STAT. UCC § 1-205 (1964); NEV. REV. STAT. § 104.1205 (1967); N.H. REV. STAT.
1973]
118 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXX
the Uniform Commercial Code4 (hereinafter UCC) with its accommoda-
tion of law to commercial convention,5 courts may now refer to
UCC §§ 1-2051 and 2-202;1 these sections permit the written terms of a
ANN. § 382A:1-205 (1961); N.J. REV. STAT. § 12A:1-205 (1962); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 50A-1-205 (1962); N.Y. UCC § 2-202 (McKinney 1964); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-
1-205 (repl. vol. 1965); N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-01-205 (1965); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 1301.11 (Baldwin 1964); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 1-205 (1963); ORE. REV.
STAT. § 71.2050 (1963); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 1-205 (1970); R.I. GEN. LAWS
ANN. § 6A-1-205 (1961); S.C. CODE ANN. § 10.1-205 (1966); S.D. CODE § 57-1-15-57-1-
20 (1969); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-1-205 (repl. vol. 1964); TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE § 1-
205 (1968); UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-1-205 (repl. vol. 1968); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9A, § 1-
205 (1966); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.1-205 (1965); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 62A.1-205
(Supp. 1970); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46-1-205 (1966); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 401.205 (1964);
Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 34-1-205 (Supp. 1969). None of the jurisdictions listed above has
enacted UCC § 1-205 in a form different than the official code. Louisiana has not adopted
the UCC.
The following are the state statutes containing the language of Uniform Commercial
Code § 2-202: ALA. CODE tit. 7A, § 2-202 (1966); ALASKA STAT. § 45.05.052 (1962);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 44-2309 (1967); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-2-202 (1961); CAL. COMM.
CODE § 2202 (West 1964); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 155-2-202 (1963); CONN. GEN.
STAT. REV. § 42a-2-202 (1960); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5A, § 2-202 (Spec. UCC Pamphlet
1967); D.C. CODE ANN. § 28:2-202 (1967); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 671.2-202 (1966); GA.
CODE ANN. § 109A-2-202 (1962); HAWAII REV. LAWS § 490:2-202 (1968); IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 28-2-202 (1967); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 26, § 2-202 (Smith-Hurd 1963); IND. ANN.
STAT. § 19-1-2-205 (repl. vol. 1964); IOWA CODE ANN. § 554.2202 (1967); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 84-2-202 (1965); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 355.2-202 (1969); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 11, § 2-202 (1964); MD. ANN. CODE art. 95B, § 2-202 (1963); MAsS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 106, § 2-202 (1963); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 19.2202 (rev. vol. 1964); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 336.2-202 (1966); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41A:2-202 (Spec. UCC Supp. 1967); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 400.2-202 (1965); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 87A-2-202 (1964); NEB. REV.
STAT. UCC § 2-202 (1964); NEV. REV. STAT. § 104.2202 (1967); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 382A:2-202 (1961); N.J. REV. STAT. § 12A:2-202 (1962); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 50A-2-202 (1962); N.Y. UCC § 2-202 (McKinney 1964); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 25.2-202 (repl. vol. 1965); N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-02-202 (1965); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 1302.05 (Baldwin 1964); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 2-202 (1963); ORE. REV.
STAT. § 72.2020 (1963); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 2-202 (1970); R.I. GEN. LAWS
ANN. § 6A-2-202 (1961); S.C. CODE ANN. § 10.2-202 (1966); S.D. CODE § 57-3-4 (1969);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-2-202 (repl. vol. 1964); TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE § 2-202 (1968);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-2-202 (repl. vol. 1968); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9A, § 2-202 (1966);
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.2-202 (1965); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 62A.2-202 (Supp. 1970); W.
VA. CODE ANN. § 46-2.202 (1966); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 402.202 (1964); Wyo. STAT.
ANN. § 34-2-202 (Supp. 1969). None of the jurisdictions listed above has enacted
UCC § 2-202 in a form different than the official code.
5See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (hereinafter UCC) § 1-102(2)(b).
OUCC § 1-205 states:
Course of Dealing and Usage of Trade
(I) A course of dealing is a sequence of previous conduct between
the parties to a particular transaction which is fairly to be regarded as
establishing a common basis of understanding for interpreting their ex-
pressions and other conduct.
(2) A usage of trade is any practice or method of dealing having
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contract to be explained and supplemented by course of dealing8 and
usage of trade9 as well as by evidence of consistent additional terms.
While § 2-202 makes course of dealing and usage of trade freely admissi-
ble when offered to explain and supplement the express terms of the
written agreement,'" this section limits the admissibility of evidence of-
fered to prove consistent additional terms.' Section 1-20512 then states
the UCC's definitions of usage of trade and course of dealing as well as
the criteria to be used by the trier of fact in determining the effect of such
such regularity of observance in a place, vocation or trade as to justify an
expectation that it will be observed with respect to the transaction in
question. The existence and scope of such a usage are to be proved as facts.
If it is established that such a usage is embodied in a written trade code
or similar writing the interpretation of the writing is for the court.
(3) A course of dealing between parties and any usage of trade in
the vocation or trade which they are engaged or of which they are or
should be aware give particular meaning to and supplement or qualify
terms of an agreement.
(4) The express terms of an agreement and an applicable course of
dealing or usage of trade shall be construed wherever reasonable as consis-
tent with each other; but when such construction is unreasonable express
terms control both course of dealing and usage of trade and course of
dealing controls usage of trade.
(5) An applicable usage of trade in the place where any part of
performance is to occur shall be used in interpreting the agreement as to
that part of the performance.
7UCC § 2-202 states:
Final Written Expression: Parol or Extrinsic Evidence
Terms with respect to which the conformatory memoranda of the
parties agree or which are otherwise set forth in a writing intended by the
parties as a final expression of their agreement with respect to such terms
as are included therein may not be contradicted by evidence of any prior
agreement or supplemented
(a) by course of dealing or usage of trade (Section 1-205) or
by course of performance (Section 2-208); and
(b) by evidence of consistent additional terms unless the court
finds the writing to have been intended also as a complete and
exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement.
"'Course of dealing" is defined, in UCC § 1-205(1). Generally "course of dealing"
refers to conduct between the parties prior to the agreement as distinguished from "course
of performance" which refers to activity made in recognition of the agreement. See Note,
An Anatomy of Sections 2-201 and 2-202 of the Uniform Commercial Code (The Statute
of Frauds and the Parol Evidence Rule), 4 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REV. 381 (1963).
'Usage of trade is defined in UCC § 1-205(2). See generally Levie, Trade Usage and
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evidence upon the written terms.
13
Since the businessman is concerned with the degree of certainty with
which his intentions will be fulfilled through his contracts, he must be
aware of what the courts in fact will do in light of the UCC in interpreting
his writings. Parties desiring to deviate from their prior course of dealing
and the usages of their trade must take into account the UCC's liberal
treatment of this extrinsic evidence and draft their contracts accordingly.
Columbia Nitrogen Corp. v. Royster Co., 4 a case providing the first
construction of UCC §§ 1-205 and 2-202 in Virginia, amply illustrates
the roles played by course of dealing and usage of trade as tools for
contractual interpretation as well as the difficulties encountered in pro-
perly determining their admissibility.
In 1966, the Columbia Nitrogen Corporation and the Royster Com-
pany, after extensive negotiations, formulated a contract'5 for Royster's
sale of a minimum quantity of phosphate at a stated price per ton each
year for three years to Columbia." In the fall of 1967, there was a drastic
drop in phosphate prices which resulted in the contract price being sub-
stantially above that of the depressed market. Consequently, Columbia
ordered only a fraction of the scheduled yearly tonnage and refused to
accept delivery on the remainder."
In Royster's suit for breach of contract, 9 Columbia defended by as-
serting that the contract terms, when explained and supplemented by
course of dealing and usage of trade, imposed no obligation upon it to
accept the minimum quantities at the prices stated in the contract.2 1 In
support of this contention, Columbia sought to introduce evidence to
show that "express price and quantity terms in contracts for materials in
the mixed fertilizer industry are mere projections to be adjusted according
"3This function was originally a matter for the judge. See generally Eskimo Pie Corp.
v. Whitelawn Dairies, Inc., 284 F. Supp. 987, 991 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). Under the UCC it
becomes a matter for the trier of fact. See generally F. James, Civil Procedure § 7-10
(1965). Of course, the judge still retains the power to decide what quantity and quality of
evidence is required to support the verdict. Calamari & Perillo, Plea for a Uniform Parol
Evidence Rule and Principles of Contract Interpretation, 42 IND. L.J. 331, 345 (1967).
"451 F.2d 3 (4th Cir. 1971). The opinion of the district court is not reported.
"Pertinent parts of the agreement are set out in the opinion. See 451 F.2d at 6 n.2.
1451 F.2d at 6.
'71d. at 7.
"Id.; see UCC § 2-606.
"The suit was brought in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.
Royster alleged diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970). Royster brought suit
under VA. CODE ANN. § 8.2-706 (1965) [UCC § 2-706] for the difference between the
contract price and the market price received on the sale of the refused scheduled phosphate
as well as damages for the remaining term of the contract. See 451 F.2d at 6, 12.
2451 F.2d at 6. Columbia also asserted an antitrust defense and a counterclaim based
on Royster's reciprocal trade practices. Id.
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to market forces." 2' Additionally, Columbia offered evidence of the prior
course of dealing between the parties to show that in previous transac-
tions, when Royster had purchased materials from Columbia, Royster's
requests for price adjustments had been routinely granted and major
tonnage deficiencies in Royster's orders had been ignored. 22 The district
court excluded all of Columbia's proffered evidence on the grounds that
the contract was not ambiguous and that the evidence, if admitted, would
contradict the written terms23 The jury then found that Columbia had
breached the contract and awarded damages to Royster.
24
In its appeal, Columbia urged that the district court erred in granting
Royster's pre-trial motion to exclude evidence of course of dealing and
usage of trade.2 The issue presented to the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit was whether § 2-202 of the. UCC permitted Columbia to
introduce evidence of course of dealing and usage of trade, which, in
explaining and supplementing the express language of the contract, might
adjust the fixed price and quantity terms to market conditions. The circuit
court concluded that the district court misconstrued the admissibility test
in that the UCC's liberal approach to the introduction of parol evidence
does not require a threshold finding of ambiguity26 and that Columbia's
proffered evidence could be reasonably construed as consistent with the
express terms of the contractY Therefore, Columbia's evidence should
have been admitted, and its exclusion required that the judgment against
Columbia be set aside and the case retried.23
21 d. at 7.
2id. at 8.
2Id. By memorandum order date April 16, 1970 the district court excluded all evi-
dence of trade usage and course of dealing. The court ruled it would not accept evidence
"which is contradictory to the express terms of the contract." Brief for Appellant at 9,
Columbia Nitrogen Corp. v. Royster Co., 451 F.2d 3 (4th Cir. 1971). Such a factual finding
by the judge for the purpose of admitting evidence is of course not binding upon the ultimate
finder of fact. See J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2430 (3d ed. 1940).
2451 F.2d at 6.
21Jd. at 7.
"Id. at 9. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.2-202 (1965) [UCC § 2-202]; see UCC § 2-202, Com-
ment 1. Comment I provides:
This section definitely rejects:
(c) The requirement that a condition precedent to the admissibility
of the type of evidence specified in paragraph (a) [Course of dealing or
usage of trade] is an original determination by the court that the language
used is ambiguous.
The VA. CODE ANN. § 8.2-202, Va. Comment states that the adoption of the UCC
rejects the Virginia rule that a finding of ambiguity is a condition precedent to admissibility.
The UCC as adopted in Virginia was intended to bring about a more liberal approach to
the introduction of parol evidence to explain or supplement a writing. Portsmouth Gas Co.
v. Shebar, 209 Va. 250, 253 n.l, 163 S.E.2d 205, 208 n.1 (1968).
"451 F.2d at 9.
mid. at 6.
1973]
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The circuit court, relying upon the "admissibility of evidence intro-
duced under § 2-202(a)" test constructed by an intermediate New York
court in Division of Triple T Service, Inc. v. Mobil Oil Corp.,9 stated:
There can be no doubt that the [UCC] restates the well established
rule that evidence of usage of trade and course of dealing should
be excluded whenever it cannot be reasonably construed as consis-
tent with the terms of the contract.
3 0
Both the Fourth Circuit and the New York court read §§ 2-202(a) and
1-205(4) together to formulate this test of admissibility.3 They reasoned
that while § 2-202(a) authorizes the free admissibility of usage of trade
and course of dealing,32 § 1-205(4) imposes the limitation that "express
terms . . . and an applicable course of dealing or usage of trade shall be
construed wherever reasonable as consistent with each other; but when
such construction is unreasonable express terms control . . ... 33 The
Fourth Circuit ruled that Columbia's evidence was admissible under the
"construed as reasonably consistent" test because the contract was "si-
lent" as to adjusting price and quantity to a declining market.34 The
court seemed to reason that since the contract itself did not deal with such
adjustment, there was nothing in the express terms with which the prof-
fered evidence could be inconsistent.
260 Misc. 2d 720, 304 N.Y.S.2d 191 (1969), affd mem., 37 App. Div. 169, 311
N.Y.S.2d 961 (1970). Express terms in a retail contract between plaintiff service station
lessee and defendant oil company, providing for termination of lease at the endof a current
three year contract on 90 days advanced notice by either party, covered the entire matter
of the termination. The plaintiff was precluded from introducing evidence that it was the
custom in the gasoline service industry to renew franchise agreements unless the franchisee
had failed in a material respect to adhere to the terms of the contract. To permit the
introduction would have the effect of implicitly inserting the words "with cause" in the
termination clause and thus contradict the express terms.
451 F.2d at 9. UCC § 2-202, Comment 2 states:
2. Paragraph (a) makes admissible evidence of course of dealing,
usage of trade and course of performance to explain or supplement the
terms of any writing stating the agreement of the parties in order that the
true understanding of the parties as to the agreement may be reached.
Such writings are to be read on the assumption that the course of prior
dealings between the parties and the usages of trade were taken for granted
when the document was phrased. Unless carefully negated they have be-
come an element of the meaning of the words used. Similarly, the course
of actual performance by the parties is considered the best indication of
what they intended the writing to mean (emphasis added).
The official comments are persuasive authority as to the meaning of the UCC. Fruehauf
Corp. v. Yale Express System, 370 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1966).
31451 F.2d at 9; 304 N.Y.S.2d at 203.
32See UCC § 2-202, Comment 2.
-UCC § 1-205(4).
U4 5 1 F.2d at 9-10.
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In order to evaluate the reasoning of the circuit court and the validity
of the admission of Columbia's evidence, it will be necessary to examine
closely the language of UCC §§ 2-202 and 1-205. Such an examination
seems to reveal that admission under § 2-202(a) is not restricted either
by a "noncontradiction" limitation derived from § 2-202 or by a "con-
strued as reasonably consistent" test constructed by reading §§ 2-202
and 1-205 together. However, there does appear to be an implied test of
characterization of evidence between §§ 2-202(a) and 2-202(b) which in
certain circumstances may serve to limit admissibility. Even if it is
assumed that evidence offered under § 2-202(a) must meet a "construed
as reasonably consistent" admissibility test, the circuit court's finding
that "silence" was determinative of consistency without reference to the
characterization test is subject to criticism. Additionally, if an application
of the characterization test reveals that the contract was not really "si-
lent," then in order to employ properly the "construed as reasonably
consistent" test it will be necessary to ascertain to what reasonable degree
evidence of course of dealing and usage of trade may vary the literal
meaning of the express terms that are being explained and supplemented.
Although the language of § 2-202 does provide a "noncontradiction"
test for admissibility, it appears to be inappropriate to evidence offered
under § 2-202(a). Section 2-202 taken alone contains two separate ideas:
Terms . . . [in a final writing] may not be contradicted by
evidence of any prior agreement or of a contemporaneous oral
agreement but [terms] may be explained or supplemented (a) by
course of dealing or usage of trade . . .5
Both predicates are directed toward the same subject, "terms," but they
express independent ideas (i.e., different criteria are applied to the admis-
sibility of different kinds of extrinsic evidence). Furthermore, Comment
2 to § 2-202(a) states that "[u]nless carefully negated . . . [course of
dealing and usage of trade] have become an element of the meaning of
the words used. '36 This comment indicates, save for the expressed excep-
tion, that there is free admissibility.37 Consequently, it would appear that
there is no express obligation that the court find "noncontradition" prior
to admission of evidence of usage of trade and course of dealing
under § 2-202(a); the obligation of noncontradiction exists only with re-
spect to evidence of a prior agreement or a contemporaneous oral agree-
ment.
UCC § 2-202. It has been contended that this language is surplusage, having been
included to point out the kind of evidence that is admissible. See R. NORDSTROM, LAW OF
SALES § 53, at 166 (1970).
14UCC § 2-202, Comment 2.
=See, e.g., Warren's Kiddie Shoppe, Inc. v. Casual Slacks, Inc., 120 Ga. App. 578,
171 S.E.2d 643, 645 (1969) (where usage of trade and course of dealing were held admissible
by reason of UCC § 2-202(a) alone).
19731
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It may be suggested that usage of trade and course of dealing are
either "prior agreements" or "contemporaneous oral agreements" and,
therefore, that the requirement imposed by § 2-202 of finding "noncon-
tradiction" must be met prior to admission under § 2-202(a). While the
UCC defines an agreement as "the bargain of the parties in fact as found
in their language or by implication from other circumstances including
course of dealing and usage of trade . . . "3 § 2-202 qualifies the
scope of "agreement," limiting it to those that are prior or contempora-
neous and oral. 9 Since the UCC characterizes a course of dealing as a
"sequence of previous conduct"4 and a usage of trade as a "practice or
method"'" of trade, the "prior" or "contemporaneous oral" limitation
placed on "agreement" renders the "noncontradiction" test inappro-
priate to a consideration of admissibility under § 2-202(a). These charac-
terizations suggest something more dynamic and ongoing than temporal
prior or contemporaneous oral agreements which have yet to be realized
through activity. They suggest repeated activity between the parties and
institutionalized activity between members of the trade. Therefore, those
events that provide a commercial context for prior or contemporaneous
oral agreements are not material to consideration of an ongoing usage
of trade or course of dealing regarding an instant agreement., Indeed,
one leading commentator has flatly asserted that a trade usage, and
presumably a course of dealing as well, is not an "agreement," and that
such evidence is not rendered inadmissible by the "noncontradiction"
provision of § 2-202. He supports his position by relying upon Comment
I to § 1-205, which states that the meaning of the agreement is to be read
in light of commercial practices.
43
Although § 2-202 itself does not seem to impose a requirementof
"noncontradiction," the court in Triple T Service found that type of
limitation when it stated that "[o]nly language consistent with the tenor
of the otherwise complete agreement is admissible under the guise of
'custom or usage' and the [UCC] effects no change in that doctrine."44
The rationale seems to be that because § 2-202(a) refers specifically
to § 1-205,11 the "construed as reasonably consistent" directive of § 1-
205(4) is incorporated by reference.48 The difficulty, however, with draw-
-UCC § 1-201(3).
IIUCC § 1-201 states that general definitions are subject to modification if the context
so requires.
JUCC § 1-205(1).
4 1UCC § 1-205(2).
42See R. NORDSTROM, LAW OF SALES § 53, at 166 (1970).
'Levie, Trade Usage and Custom under the Common Law and the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, 40 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1101 (1965).
"1304 N.Y.S.2d at 203.45UCC § 1-205.
4 See text accompanying note 31 supra.
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ing upon § 1-205 for substantive rules of admissibility is that § 1-205,
as a provision applicable generally throughout the UCC, is more reasona-
bly viewed in light of its language as a principle of interpretation., For
example, although subsection (3) to § 1-205 substantially restates the
language of § 2-202(a), it does not state or imply any prerequisite for
admissibility, but instead goes to the role of usage of trade and course of
dealing in interpretation. Similarly, § 1-205(4),"8 the source of Triple T.
Service's test, deals not with admissibility but with the significance and
use of admitted evidence; it is more reasonable to view it, in light of its
language and placement within the UCC, as essentially an instruction to
the trier of fact.4" The Triple T. Service limitation on admissibility is
further weakened simply by the way in which the language of the subsec-
tions in § 2-202 is arranged. "Consistent" is used in § 2-202(b) as
clearly a prerequisite to admissibility of evidence offered to supplement
or explain express terms by "additional terms." Significantly, "consis-
tent" does not appear directly in § 2-202(a) to limit admissibility of
usage of trade and course of dealing offered for the same purpose."0
Apparently the circuit court in Columbia did not question the validity
of the Triple T Service test and consequently applied a "construed as
reasonably consistent" restriction, under which it determined that it was
reasonable to construe the proffered evidence as consistent with the ex-
press terms of the contract.5 However, since the evidence was admitted,
the result reached was the same as if this test had not been utilized.
Although evidence offered under § 2-202(a) does not seem to be sub-
ject to a "construed as reasonably consistent" admissibility test, there
'7UCC art. 1, pt. 2. UCC § 1-109 states "[s]ection captions are parts of this Act."
1SUCC § 1-205, Comment I states:
This Act rejects both the "lay-dictionary" and the "conveyancer's"
reading of a commercial agreement. Instead the meaning of the agreement
of the parties is to be determined by the language used by them and by
their action, read and interpreted in the light of commercial practices and
other surrounding circumstances. The measure and background for
interpretation are set by the commercial context, which may explain and
supplement even the language of a formal or final writing (emphasis
added).
11UCC § 2-202(a) provides that terms may also be explained or supplemented "by
course of performance (Section 2-208) . . . ." Section 2-208(2) substantially restates the
language of § 1-205(4) in terms of course of performance. Much of the same reasoning
which is persuasive that § 1-205(4) should be viewed as a principle of interpretation for the
trier of fact rather than as an admissibility requirement, applies to § 2-208(2) as well.
Comment I to § 2-208 states that course of performance is the best indication of the
meaning of the agreement. Comment 2 states that "a course of performance is always
relevant to determine the meaning of the agreement." Therefore, it would seem that all
evidence offered under UCC § 2-202(a) is freely admissible.
-UCC § 2-202.
11451 F.2d at 9.
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does appear to be found in § 2-202 an alternative test, not mentioned by
the circuit court, which relates to the nature of the evidence offered for
admission and which may serve to exclude Columbia's evidence. The
purpose of evidence offered under § 2-202 is to explain and supplement
terms,52 but § 2-202 and its subdivisions may be read to impose different
requirements of admissibility upon different types of evidence. Evidence
offered under § 2-202 to explain or supplement a term will fall into either
of two categories: § 2-202(a) course of dealing and usage of trade or § 2-
202(b) consistent additional terms.
While categorization between the two subsections of § 2-202 is often
difficult, the UCC's definition of "term" may furnish an important guide-
line to facilitate this task. The UCC defines a "term" as "that portion
of the agreement which relates to a particular matter."54 The incorpora-
tion of the word "particular" denotes a meaning more precise than
merely the general subject matter of the writing.55 For example, the por-
tion of a writing relating to mode of performance would be a different
matter than that relating to time of performance, and the portion relating
to the quality of goods would be different from that relating to the quant-
ity of goods, even though in the former both relate to the general matter
of performance and in the latter both relate to goods.56 The result of this
classification of evidence between §§ 2-202(a) and 2-202(b) rests, of
course, upon the court's conception of "particular matter." If the prof-
fered evidence relates to a matter sufficiently distinguishable from any
express term in the writing, then it is not admissible under § 2-202(a);
instead it should be construed as evidence of an additional term and must
meet the tests of admissibility applicable to § 2-202(b). 7 The significance
of this classification is that while evidence introduced under § 2-202(a)
is freely admissible,58 evidence introduced under § 2-202(b) will not be
N
2 UCC § 2-202.
53d.
-UCC § 1-201 (42).
-See R. NORDSTROM, LAW OF SALES § 53, at 163-65 (1970).
56But see Valley Nat'l Bank v. Babylon Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 53 Misc. 2d 1029,
280 N.Y.S.2d 786, affd mem., 28 App. Div. 1092, 284 N.Y.S.2d 849 (1967).
5 The problem is that § 2-202 and its subsections draw a dichotomy between usage of
trade and course of dealing when used to explain and supplement and when used to add
consistent additional terms. The former is freely admissible, but the latter must meet the
test of consistency. "[U]nfortunately the two subdivisions of § 2-202 are not antithetical
but overlap .. " Levie, The Interpretation of Contracts in New York under the Uniform
Commercial Code, 10 N.Y.L.F. 350, 370 (1964). If parties intend for usage of trade or
course of dealing to prove an additional term, the policies behind finding that the parties
did not intend the written agreement to be complete and exclusive are as relevant as those
concerning simple additional terms. UCC § 2-202, Comment 3. See 4 S. WILLISTON,
CONTRACTS §§ 631-38 (3d ed. 1961). Therefore, the admissibility tests of § 2-202(b) should
apply to course of dealing and usage of trade introduced to prove additional terms.
IsNote 37 supra. See text accompanying notes 47-49 supra.
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admitted if the court finds either that it is inconsistent with the express
terms or that ". . . the writing [was] intended also as a complete and
exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement."59
If the "particular matter" guideline to the classification of evidence
between the subsections of § 2-202 is applied to Columbia and if within
the circuit court's finding that the "contract was silent about adjusting
price and quantities to reflect a declining market,"60 such "adjustment"
is considered a particular matter to which the contract is really "silent,"
then the proffered evidence of usage of trade and course of dealing is not
admissible under § 2-202(a) but must be introduced under § 2-202(b):6 1
[i]f a writing is silent with respect to a particular matter its legal
effect is that it imposes no obligation with respect to the matter
as to which it is silent. If a course of dealing or usage of trade adds
a term to the transaction it imposes an obligation which did not
exist. It is true that it supplements the agreement but it also con-
tradicts the agreement's failure to make provision as to the partic-
ular matter."
In fact, Royster contended that Columbia's extrinsic evidence should
have been excluded under the contract clause which stated:
No verbal understanding will be recognized by either party
hereto; this contract expresses all the terms and conditions of the
agreement .... 13
In rejecting this contention the circuit court ruled that "course of dealing
and trade usage are not synonymous with verbal understandings, terms
and conditions." 4 While this statement may be true in regard to admis-
sion under § 2-202(a), it is questionable if evidence is advanced to prove
additional terms under § 2-202(b). s
The quoted contract clause has incorporated within it the language of
"merger," i.e., that the writing is the complete expression of the parties'
entire agreement. Comment 3 to UCC § 2-202(b) provides for the ex-
51UCC § 2-202.
61451 F.2d at 9. The circuit court also suggested that the proffered evidence was consis-
tent with the title, "Products Supplied Under Contract Clause," and the default clause of
the contract. Id. at 10. However, these findings are immaterial since these are not the terms
being supplemented.
"See text accompanying note 56 supra.
11R. ANDERSON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, Vol. I § 2-202:21 (1970).
11451 F.2d at 10.
GAId.
OUCC § 2-202(b) provides for proof of consistent additional terms.
"IUCC § 2-202(b). W. WILLIER & F. HART, FORMS AND PROCEDURES UNDER THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 21.06(2), Form 2-1, clause 2 (1971):
(1) This writing is intended by the parties as a final expression of their
19731
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clusion of evidence of consistent additional terms when the court finds
that the "writing was intended by both parties as a complete and exclusive
statement of all terms . . . ' -6' Thus, the incorporation of a merger
clause in the writing would prove such an intent by the parties and would
exclude evidence offered to prove additional terms under § 2-202(b),
even though consistent with the express terms of the contract. 8 Therefore,
the circuit court's finding that the "contract was silent about adjusting
price and quantities to reflect a declining market," 9 although made in the
context of its "construed as reasonably consistent" test,70 is especially
significant because the court's conclusion may be viewed as suggesting
that Columbia's course of dealing and usage of trade evidence should be
considered as evidence of an additional term to be dealt with under § 2-
202(b).
71
However, it should be argued that to consider adjusting price and
quantity to reflect a declining market as a "term" would require too
narrow a view of "particular matter" as expressed in the UCC's defini-
tion of "term" and would contradict the liberality of § 1-205(3).72 Thus,
Columbia's evidence should not be viewed as seeking to "explain and
supplement" the express terms by evidence of additional terms, since the
evidence introduced would adjust price and quantity to market conditions
while the express terms relate to a fixed price and quantity. Both the
evidence and the express terms relate to the same "particular matters,"
price and quantity. Under the foregoing contention, Columbia could in-
troduce its evidence under § 2-202(a), free from the exclusionary effect
of § 2-202(b)'s response to the merger language in the contract.
agreement and is intended also as a complete and exclusive statement of
the terms of their agreement.
"TUCC § 2-202, Comment 3 states:
(3) Under paragraph (b) consistent additional terms, not reduced to
writing, may be proved unless the court finds that the writing was intended
by both parties as a complete and exclusive statement of all the terms. If
the additional terms are such that, if agreed upon, they would certainly
have been included in the document in the view of the court, then evidence
of their alleged making must be kept from the trier of fact.
In the case of Michael Schiavone & Sons, Inc. v. Securalloy Co., Inc., 312 F. Supp. 801
(D. Conn. 1970), the contract contained no merger clause, and, therefore, evidence that
defendant orally understood the quantity term to mean "up to 500 tons" could not be
inconsistent with the terms of the written contract which specified the quantity as "500
tons," and was admissible under § 2-202(b) as evidence of a consistent additional term. See
also Pacific Indem. Co. v. McDermott Bros., 336 F. Supp. 963 (M.D. Pa. 1971); McDown
v. Wilson, 426 S.W.2d 112 (Mo. Ct. App. 1968); Connor v. May, 444 S.W.2d 948 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1969).
"See text accompanying note 58 supra.
11451 F.2d at 9.
7O/d.




However, if the Triple TService "construed as reasonably consistent"
test of admissibility is assumed to be valid, the circuit court's failure to
recognize the "particular matter" guideline renders its conclusion that
"silence" equals consistency inappropriate. Silence regarding price and
quantity adjustment may be a relevant consideration 3 in determining
consistency, but it is by no means conclusive. Section 1-205(3)," 4 relating
to the purpose for which the evidence is offered, and § 1-205(4), 71 impos-
ing the requirement of consistency, read together, indicate that the test
of admissibility would be whether the usage of trade and course of dealing
supplement or qualify an express term in a consistent manner. "Silence"
alone does not adequately explain a finding of consistency because, as
discussed previously, there must be a prior characterization of "particular
matter" which would classify evidence between §§ 2-202(a) and 2-
202(b).71 Therefore, a finding of "silence" alone begs the question as to
whether the explanation and supplementation contradict the express
terms.
In Columbia there may appear to be an inconsistency between the
express terms and the proffered evidence. The contract expressly provides
definite price and quantity terms,77 but Columbia contended that these
were "mere projections to be adjusted according to market forces.
'78
Section 1-205(3) of the UCC makes usage of trade and course of dealing
admissible to "supplement or qualify" the agreement which "presumably
means to 'cut down' express terms although not to negate them en-
tirely. '7 The relationship between §§ 1-205(3) and (4) indicates that Col-
umbia's evidence could be viewed as consistent if one accepts the proposi-
tion that it qualifies" the meaning of the expressed terms without render-
ing them nugatory. While the UCC itself does not attempt to provide an
answer to the problem of how many degrees separate an explanation from
a contradiction,8" some courts have been willing to permit evidence of
"See United States v. Copeland Milnes Wool Co., 242 F.2d 659, 663 (7th Cir. 1957).
"4Note 6 supra.
751d.
7 See text accompanying note 56 supra.
7451 F.2d at 6 n.2.
"Id. at 7.
"See generally Note, An Anatomy of Sections 2-201 and 2-202 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code (The Statute of Frauds and the Parol Evidence Rule), 4 B.C. IND. & COM.
L. REV. 381 (1963).
11451 F.2d at 7.
"Note, An Anatomy of Sections 2-201 and 2-202 of the Uniform Commercial Code
(The Statute of Frauds and the Parol Evidence Rule), 4 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REV. 381,
383 (1963). There would seem to be a limit to qualification through consistent supplementa-
tion. In cases involving express quantity terms, courts have been willing to permit usage of
trade to establish adjustment according to market factors where the usage varied the obliga-
tion to a definable extent to accept or deliver goods rather than render it nugatory.
Two pre-code cases furnish an illustration of this principle. In Nicoll v. Pittsvein Coal
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course of dealing and usage of trade to qualify the written terms, short
of negating them entirely, in order to find consistency."'
In view of this liberal treatment of "consistency," the facts in
Columbia do support a conclusion that there is consistent supplementa-
tion. The contract provides that Columbia "agrees to purchase and accept
.. . [and Royster] agrees to furnish quantities of [raw materials] . ..
on the following terms and conditions . . . .Minimum Tonnage Per
Year . . . . Price [per ton]." Columbia did not seek to render its
express contractual obligation to purchase 'and to accept a complete null-
ity; instead, Columbia merely contended that the contract's price and
quantity terms should be adjusted to conform to market conditions. Con-
sequently, even if this contention were given effecty Columbia would still
be obligated to pay a price, the market price, for the adjusted quantity.
Triple T Service presents the contrasting situation. In that case, an
express termination clause was held to be inconsistent with a proffered
trade usage which required a showing of cause before exercising termina-
tion. While both the express term and the trade usage related to the same
matter, i.e., termination, and to that extent fell within the scope of § 2-
202(a), it would not be reasonable to say that they did not impose con-
trary obligations.85 Thus, the usage evidence could not meet the "con-
strued as reasonably consistent" test ingrafted onto § 2-202(a) by the
New York court.
The treatment of admissibility by the Fourth Circuit in Columbia and
the criticism of the court's reasoning raise the question of whether the
contract could have been drafted to exclude the admission of evidence
under § 2-202(a). If the Triple T Service test of admissibility is valid,
Co., 269 F. 968 (2d Cir. 1920), the seller of a quantity of coal was relieved of his obligation
to deliver the contract amount where he proved a usage of trade to the effect that if there
were a shortage of railroad cars available for shipment, shipments of coal to buyers could
be pro-rated. In Pickards, Mather & Co. v. Kuhn & Co., 8 F.2d 704 (6th Cir. 1925), the
buyer was not permitted to show that by a usage of trade his obligation to receive and pay
for coal supplied under the contract was discharged because his plants were shut down and
no longer needed coal. This suggests that variance along a quantity scale will only contradict
an expressed term at zero.
2See, e.g., Michael Schiavone & Sons, Inc. v. Securalloy Co., Inc., 312 F. Supp. 801
(D. Conn. 1970).
1451 F.2d at 6 n.2.
"See, e.g., Plyant, Inc. v. Escambia Treating Co., 276 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1960).
Columbia's proffered evidence meets the limitations of consistency as being acceptable until
the obligation imposed by the express term is negated. Even though a qualification of the
contract's price and quantity terms will reduce, i.e., "qualify," the price that Columbia is
obligated to pay and the amount it is obligated to accept to meet the conditions of the
depressed market, Columbia is still required to accept a quantity greater than zero and to
pay a price greater than zero despite the finding by the circuit court that Columbia has no
obligation to accept. See text accompanying note 83 supra.
11304 N.Y.S.2d at 202-03.
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then § 1-205(4) impliedly recognizes the propriety of excluding evidence
of usage of trade and course of dealing when the express terms of the
agreement and an applicable course of dealing and usage of trade cannot
be reasonably construed as consistent with each other. 6 If, however,
UCC § 1-205(4) is not a test for admissibility but instead a principle of
interpretation, the practical result should be the same, since a binding
instruction should be given to the trier of fact to view the express term
as controlling if it cannot be reasonably construed as consistent with the
proffered evidence.
While extrinsic evidence of course of dealing and usage of trade will
normally be read into their agreement through a reasonable construction,
the parties may agree to the contrary and such agreement will be given
effect. Comment 2 to § 2-202 indicates that a carefully drafted clause
may exclude evidence of course of dealing and usage of trade if it does
so expressly. 7 When usages are to be negated or past practice changed,
the apparent means to effectuate a departure from trade practice or prior
conduct is an express term in the contract."8 Consequently, Royster
should have incorporated a clause in the writing negating the applicability
of the very course of dealing and usage of trade proffered by Columbia
to interpret either the express price and quantity terms or any provision
in the contract. Alternatively, Royster could have negated the use of any
course of dealing or usage of trade to explain or supplement either the
contract's price and quantity terms or any portion of the writing. Since
the test of admissibility of parol evidence to explain or supplement the
-UCC § 1-205(4).
PUCC § 2-202, Comment 2; see note 30 supra.
mR. ANDERSON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, LEGAL FORMS, at 33 (1963) provides
an example of a merger clause. Form 1.49 states:
This contract contains all the terms thereof and shall not be modified,
controlled, or affected in any way by any usage of trade [or course of
dealing] not expressly included in a term of this contract.
See Provident Tradesmen's Bank & Trust Co. v. Pemberton, 24 Pa. D. & C.2d 720 (1960),
affd per curiam, 196 Pa. Super. 180, 173 A.2d 780 (1961). This case demonstrates the
specificity necessary in such a provision. The plaintiff bank, which financed a car sale for
the defendant automobile dealer, failed to notify the defendant before the car was wrecked
that insurance coverage had lapsed. The court held that the bank's prior practice of always
notifying the defendant upon lapse in insurance coverage, according to the trade custom,
had justified defendant's expectation of notice in this case, despite defendant's waiver in the
security agreement. Since parties generally take their course of dealing and the usages of
their trade for granted, the UCC interprets all contract provisions with reference to that
conduct unless the agreement specifically provides otherwise. Thus the bank erred by relying
on a printed, general waiver-of-notice clause, which clause might be reasonably construed
as consistent with the settled practice of notification of lapses in insurance coverage by
applying the clause only to notices stipulated in the written agreement. The clause should
have expressly declared its usurpation of this trade usage and of the parties' prior pattern
of dealing so that no reasonable construction could give this practice effect. For a contrary
view, see the dissent of Flood, J., in 173 A.2d 780.
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terms of the writing is one of determining the intent of the parties, the
affirmative presumption being that they contracted in accordance with
course of dealing and usage of trade, a clause negating their use generally
rather than negating specific courses of dealing and usages of trade will,
if nothing more, show their general inapplicability in determining intent. 9
However, since few, if any, contracts are sufficiently detailed to operate
without some supplementation with trade usage, a negation of all would
be commercially unacceptable.
Furthermore, to inject into a delicate negotiating process a debate
over the inclusion of a negation clause might well increase the difficulty
of reaching an agreement as to the express content of the writing. While
Royster, by incorporating such a clause, either specific or general, would
probably have avoided the introduction of Columbia's evidence, it must
be also borne in mind that it would be unlikely that Columbia would have
subscribed to such a term." Thus, in order to avoid the effect of prior
course of dealing and usage of trade in explaining the contract, Royster
would have had to notify Columbia clearly of a negation through the
writing and this notification could well have gone to the heart of the
agreement. Due to the significance of this evidence in contractual inter-
pretation, it follows that if course of dealing or usage of trade are to be
bargained away, such waiver should be done intelligently.
It is apparent that the incorporation of the UCC into the statutory
framework of almost every state and the construction placed upon it by
judicial decision will have a significant impact upon the sources available
to the trier of fact in the interpretation of sales contracts. In accord with
the UCC's policy of free admissibility under § 2-202(a), Columbia's evi-
dence was admitted despite the problems encountered by the Fourth
Circuit in making that determination through an application of the ques-
tionable Triple TService "construed as reasonably consistent" test. Nev-
ertheless, the significance of the proffered course of dealing and usage of
trade will not be determined until the trier of fact views both Columbia's
evidence and rebutting evidence offered by Royster and determines the
effect of all evidence upon the written terms. The trier of fact will be
guided in this process by the principles of interpretation contained in § 1-
205. Despite the fact that businessmen generally order their writings in
"1UCC § 2-202, Comment 2; see note 30 supra.
"See Note, An Anatomy of Sections 2-201 and 2-202 of the Uniform Commercial
Code (the Statute of Frauds and the Parol Evidence Rule), 4 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv.
381 (1963).
"During the contract negotiations, Columbia rejected a Royster proposal for liquidated
damages of ten dollars for each ton Columbia declined to accept. On the other hand,
Royster rejected a Columbia proposal for a clause that tied the price to the market by
obligating Royster to conform its price to offers Columbia received from other phosphate
producers. 451 F.2d at 10.
